Brief of Monroe v. Davis

EOL 469: Legal Basis of Educational Practice

David M. Stone, University Laboratory High School, Urbana, IL USA

Brief of Monroe v. Davis

Plaintiff: AURELIA DAVIS, AS NEXT FRIEND OF LASHONDA D.

Defendant: MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.

No. 97-843

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

119 S. Ct. 1661; 1999 U.S. LEXIS 3452; 143 L. Ed. 2d 839; 67 U.S.L.W. 4329; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3861; 99 Daily Journal

DAR 4931; 12 Fla. Law W. Fed. S 280; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2948

Argued January 12, 1999, Decided May 24, 1999

Facts

Aurelia Davis filed suit against the Monroe County School Board and school officials, seeking damages for sexual harassment of her daughter LaShonda by G. F., a fifth-grade classmate at a public elementary school. Davis alleged that the school administration's deliberate indifference to G. F.'s persistent sexual advances toward LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school environment that violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits a student from being "excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

The alleged harassment began in December, 1992. During the next two months LaShonda reported three separate incidents to her mother and teacher, Diane Fort. Aurelia Davis reported each of these incidents to the school's principal, Bill Querry. During the next several months the alleged conduct continued, with LaShonda reporting incidents occurring in the classrooms of P.E. teacher Whit Maples and Joyce Pippin. LaShonda immediately informed the teachers, and Aurelia Davis contacted each of the teachers to follow up her daughter's reports. In March, a second incident occurred in P.E. class. LaShonda informed both Maples and Pippin of the incident. In April, 1993, G.F. allegedly rubbed against LaShonda, which she reported to Fort. In May, 1993, G.F.was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, sexual battery of LaShonda Davis.

The alleged impact of the harassment was a drop in LaShonda's grades and her father's discovery of a suicide note.

Davis alleges that no disciplinary action was taken against G.F. and that Querry statements to her involved "threatening G.F. a little harder"as well as asking why LaShonda was the only student complaining. No effort was made to separate the two students. In fact, LaShonda was permitted to change her classroom seat only after the third month of alleged harassment. Additionally, the Monroe County Board of Education did nothing during this period of alleged harassment in terms of instructing its own personnel on how to respond to sexual harassment, and had not established a policy on that issue.

Davis filed suit on May 4, 1994 in the US District Court for the Middle School District of Georgia against the School Board, the school superintendent and Principal Querry for violation of her daughter's Title IX rights. Davis sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. The court dismissed charges against the individuals, stating that only institutions, not individuals, are subject to liability under Title IX. The court also dismissed charges against the Board because neither the board nor any employees of the board had a role in the sexual harassment.

In May, 1996, Davis appealed the initial decision, dropping the Board from her suit. A panel of the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit again dismissed the suit.

The final iteration of this case went before the Supreme Court of the United States on January 12, 1999 and was decided May 24, 1999.

Issues

Issue 1

Can a recipient of federal education funding be be held liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment?

Issue 2

Can a district's failure to respond to student-on-student sexual harassment in its schools support a private suit for money damages?

Rule

Sexual Harassment, Title IX.

Holding

5-4, majority opinion by O'Connor. "A private Title IX damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student-on-student harassment, but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school (Monroe v. Davis, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/ed-online/cter/EOL469/mvd.html )."

In terms of the first issue presented above, the ruling of the Supreme Court was "yes", a recipient of federal funding can be held liable for damages under Title IX. In terms of the second issue presented above the answer is again "yes". The Supreme Court decision reinstates Aurelia Davis' suit. The next step in the process is for a jury to determine whether LaShonda's specific allegations justify an award (James J. Kilpatrick, "Ruling opens door to school lawsuits," Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette, 6-22-99, p. A-4).

Court's Reasoning

An implied private right of action for money damages exists under Title IX, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 117 L. Ed. 2d 208, 112 S. Ct. 1028, where funding recipients had adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at issue, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist.-- a school district may be liable for damages under Title IX where it is deliberately indifferent to known acts of teacher-student sexual harassment -- also applies in cases of student-on-student harassment.
Title IX's regulatory scheme has long provided funding recipients with notice that they may be liable for their failure to respond to non-agents' discriminatory acts.
The common law has also put schools on notice that they may be held responsible under state law for failing to protect students from third parties' tortious acts.
At the time of the events in the document, a publication for school attorneys and administrators indicated that student-on-student harassment could trigger Title IX liability.
Subsequent Department of Education policy guidelines provide that such harassment falls within Title IX's scope.
Title IX proscribes sexual harassment with sufficient clarity to satisfy Pennhurst's notice requirement and serve as a basis for a damages action.
Having previously held that such harassment is "discrimination" in the school context under Title IX, the Supreme Court is constrained to conclude that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can likewise rise to the level of "discrimination" actionable under the statute.
It is not necessary to show an overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources to make out a damages claim for sexual harassment under Title IX, but a plaintiff must show harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victims are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities.
Applying this standard to the facts at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint. The Supreme Court cannot say beyond doubt that she can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. Davis alleges that LaShonda was the victim of repeated acts of harassment by G. F. over a 5-month period, and allegations support the conclusion that his misconduct was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Moreover, the complaint alleges that multiple victims of G. F.'s misconduct sought an audience with the school principal and that the harassment had a concrete, negative effect on LaShonda's ability to receive an education. The complaint also suggests that petitioner may be able to show both actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part of the Board, which made no effort either to investigate or to put an end to the harassment.

Consequences

This decision leads to more questions than answers, potentially opening a floodgate of litigation throughout public schools across the US..

On the positive side, administrators will need to take seriously all information regarding student-on-student sexual harassment from the onset, documenting their interactions and actions taken to alleviate potential problems.

Will this decision result in the need for administrative and classroom constraints on student behavior in student-student interactions? Potentially yes, which may in turn lead to additional potential for litigation. Will this decision lead to repression of student freedom of speech? Potentially yes, again leading to additional litigation.Will this decision result in a barrage of additional lawsuits? Quite possibly. How will schools be able to afford additional law suit-related advice and litigation-related activities? Additionally, if the harasser is diagnosed to have a behavior disorder disability which leads to an accusation, that individual's school is limited in the degree to which it can take disciplinary action by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Finally, vocabulary throughout Title IX is vague, leading to potential for a wide variety of interpretations and therefore additional lawsuits.

Created 8/27/99. Last modified 8/29/99.