EOL 469: Legal Basis of Educational Practice

David M. Stone, University Laboratory High School, Urbana, IL USA

Four Cases Dealing with the Constitutionality of Assessing Public School Fees

The four court cases I read today clearly reinforce one of the statements on p. 61 of Alexander and Alexander, that being "Courts continue today to ponder the nature of the states' relationship to the central government..." This lack of clarity is probably no more obvious than when considering the constitutionality of charging fees to students attending public K-12 institutions.

Based on our readings and the generalizations made by Alexander and Alexander regarding education provisions of state constitutions (pp. 30 -31, particularly #4 on p. 31) there is general agreement among state constitutions that public schooling should be "free", though the dimensions of the term "free" appear to vary from state to state. There is general consensus among the state constitutions that tuition will not be charged to any students attending public schools. State constitutions vary regarding the acceptability of charging additional fees (e.g. extracurricular activity fees, supply fees and lunchroom fees). In fact, many of the state constitutions do not address the issue at all. Constitutional omission or lack of clarity regarding pubic school fees led to the four cases comprising this assignment. Below you will find a brief description of the holding of three Illinois cases and explanation of how they differ from the Hartzell v. Connell, a California-based case dealing with charging students a $25 fee for each extracurricular activity.

Hartzell v. Connell (Alexander and Alexander, pp.51-55)
Issue: Can a public school charge activity fees for extracurricular activities?
Facts: The Santa Barbara Board of Education chose to impose extracurricular fees rather than make drastic budget cuts. Students who were eligible for free lunches were also eligible fee waivers.
Holding: The California constitution and court holdings were that imposition of fees for educational activities, whether they are part of the traditional school day or extracurricular, violates the constitutional free school guarantee. California says "NO FEES, PERIOD!"

The three Illinois cases also dealt with the constitutionality of changing fees to public school students. In all three cases the charge of additional fees was deemed acceptable by the courts. Each case is briefly outlined below:

Hamer v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 109
Issue: Can a public school charge a textbook rental fee?
Facts: Hamer, a resident of School District No. 109 , has four children attending schools in the district. In August 1969 he was asked to pay a textbook rental fee for each of his children attending school and told he could work out a confidential arrangement with the treasurer of the district if needed. Hamer did not pay the textbook rental or make any arrangement with the district treasurer. His children were initially supplied with textbooks at the beginning of the 1969-1970 school year. Because he did not pay the textbook rental or make the confidential arrangement with the treasurer, the textbooks were taken from the children. Hamer then instituted action against the school board, citing a number of amendment violations.
Rule: Just about everything was brought up int his case. Federal constitution rules were the First Amendment (right of assembly), the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) and the Fourteenth amendment (due process and equal protection of the laws).  Sections form the Illinois constitution were 1 (right to privacy), 2 (due process), 6 (search and seizure), 14 (granting special privileges), 17 (right of assembly), 19 (right to remedy and justice), 20 (recurrence to fundamental principles) of article II; article III (distribution of powers); sections 22 (special laws prohibiting), and 23 (release of public debts prohibited) of article IV; section 1 (right to free common school education) of article VIII; and sections 1,2,3,9 and 10 (taxation) of article IX.
Holding: Yes, based on the Illinois constitution the textbook rental fee is reasonable.
Court Reasoning: Early acts (1860-1872) dealing with public education funding made no provision for furnishing students with textbooks at public expense. This continues to the present.

Beck v. Board of Education of Harlem Consolidated School District No.122
Issue: Can a school which furnishes free textbooks charge student fees for supplies?
Facts: In 1938 the citizens of Consolidated School District No.122 voted in favor of a furnishing free textbooks to public school students. Beck interpreted the term "textbook" to include all required student supplies including a dictionary, workbooks, magazine subscriptions; duplicating paper for materials distributed in class, masters used in duplicating, printed answer sheets, learning center supplies, file folders for the student to keep, paper, paint, glue, modeling clay, chalk, pencils, and marking pens used and consumed in class, a map, chemicals to be used in the laboratory, a worm for the science class, sewing class supplies, cooking class food items, as well as use of a lock, towels, scissors, atlases, pamphlets, paperback books to be retained and used the following year by the school.
Rule: Sections 28--14,28--15,10--20.5,10--20.8 of the school code
Holding: Yes, a school which furnishes free textbooks can charge student fees for supplies.
Court Reasoning: Using the common definition of the term "textbooks" in the Webster's dictionary, the court determined that nothing on the list fit the definition of "textbook" encountered in the dictionary.

Ambroiggio v. Board of Education of School District No. 44
Issue: Does assessment of a lunchroom fee violate the free education clause of the state constitution?
Facts: The district's school lunch program was not mandatory. Not all students took advantage of the school lunch program. Students who lived within .7 miles of the school were charged a fee to use the lunchroom facilities, while those who lived more than .7 miles away were not assessed a lunchroom fee. The fees supported the wages of the non-certified lunchroom supervisory staff as well as other undefined program costs.
Rule: School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 122, par. 1 -- 1 et seq., and the free education clause of the State Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1), which provides that "[e]ducation in public schools through the secondary level shall be free."
Holding: No, assessment of a lunchroom fee does not violate the free education clause of the state constitution, therefore the additional lunchroom fee is acceptable under the Illinois constitution.
Personal Thought: This was really a sloppy case. It seems that the plaintiff should have examined whether the arbitrary classification system (students within .7 miles of the school were charged a fee to use the lunchroom facilities, while those who lived more than .7 miles away were not assessed a lunchroom fee) violated the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and should have used this as the basis for abolishing the supplementary lunchroom fee.

The final part of this week's assignment is to explain in 2-3 paragraphs the learning regarding power and authority in Illinois on this topic and post to WebBoard. I'm taking the liberty of expanding the topic to both federal and state government power and authority since they are so closely interwoven and discussion solely of power and authority in Illinois would be relatively incomplete without some discussion of its relationship to to the federal government.

Federal and State Education Power and Authority as They Apply to School Fees

The Tenth Amendment makes clear that federal control of education is indirect and secondary to the power exercised by the states. Areas of state concern and responsibility include creation, organization and reorganization of school districts, employment and dismissal of personnel, establishment of curriculum, teacher and school accreditation, and management of school physical plant and managerial functions. The role of the federal government centers around general welfare (taxing and expending, though the government can put "strings" on education-related expenditures), the commerce clause (national minimum wage, child labor laws) and protection of individual rights and freedoms. When state and federal statutes conflict, federal statutes take precedence over state statutes.

The state's authority is not a distributive one to be exercised by local government, but is a central power residing in the state. The state legislature has both the power and the responsibility to enact laws to govern education. The administrative structure of the state includes both local and state boards of education . State Boards are elected or appointed bodies which have the authority to to administer the school system of the state, as well as implement and administer statutes. The State Board of Education can't delegate discretionary responsibility, but can delegate ministerial responsibility (clear cut situations in which no exercise of judgment is permitted). Local school boards focus their efforts and administration energies on issues specific to their school districts, each of which is assigned a specific unit number by the state. Local school boards have two main areas of responsibility, those being discretionary and ministerial (clear cut situations in which no exercise of judgment is permitted) responsibility. Each school board makes decisions regarding the education programs, personnel and philosophical issues which shape their district's educational programs. Courts will not interfere with a school board's decisions and other exercises of discretion except when the board's action violates the law, abuses authority or involves contracting in areas which extend beyond the board's authority. School boards are not the sole arbiters (did I use that term correctly?) in all of the decisions that impact a school district. Educational tribunals (courts of law or administrative agencies) form an important source of law under which education operates. There is an implicit assumption of neutrality on the tribunals's behalf, which is also guaranteed through constitutional provision. Tribunal decisions are binding on the parties involved. In Illinois, a court of review cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative tribunal.

Given this background, how do federal and state education entities deal with the issue of fees? In our particular situation, it appears that as long as the state of Illinois does not assess tuition to its public K-12 students, the state can do whatever it wishes, provided those fees are assessed equitably. Individual school boards have the right to establish fee levels for various grade levels in the school district, as well as make special provisions (e.g. Harlem school district's providing free textbooks to all of its public school students based on the 1938 community voting decision) they deem appropriate. Because the subject of schools fees is not specifically addressed in either state or federal constitutions, their constitutionality will likely continue to be a topic of debate and litigation in the state of Illinois.

Created 8/29/99. Last modified 9/9/99.